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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
All the signs point to the existence of a growing exodus ofskilled Zimbabweans from the country. Although the precisedimensions and impacts of this “brain drain” have yet to bedetermined, the Zimbabwean government has recently
sought to stem the tide with various policy measures. The education
and health sectors appear to be the hardest hit although professionals in
other sectors have also been leaving in numbers.
The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) has undertaken a
multi-country study of the brain drain within and from the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). SAMP’s primary contribu-
tion is to examine the skills base of a country and, on the basis of
nationally-representative surveys, determine the future emigration
potential of skilled people who remain. In other words, SAMP provides
critical policy-relevant information on the likely course of the brain
drain in the future and the effectiveness of policy measures that might
be deployed to slow or reverse the brain drain.
The Zimbabwean survey was conducted in 2001. A representative
sample of 900 skilled Zimbabweans was interviewed to obtain informa-
tion on personal and household economic circumstances; attitudes
towards current and future economic, social and political circumstances;
likelihood of emigration in the future; and attitudes towards measures
designed to keep them in the country. The majority of the respondents
(844) were African. Thus, the survey results are focused primarily on
the emigration potential of black Zimbabweans. The white sample was
too small to say anything of significance about white intentions. The
respondents were drawn from a wide variety of professions and sectors
and therefore represent a broad cross-section of skilled Zimbabweans.
The first significant finding is that 57% of the sampled population
have given a “great deal” of thought to emigrating from Zimbabwe
(with another 29% having given the matter some thought). Only 13%
have given it no consideration. A comparison with South Africa is ger-
mane since that country is widely believed to be undergoing a crippling
brain drain. In South Africa, only 31% of the skilled population have
given a great deal of thought to emigrating, with 31% having not
thought about it at all.
In terms of gender breakdown, more women than men have given a
great deal of thought to emigrating (62% versus 54%), which is the
opposite of the South African scenario. In age terms, it is Zimbabweans
in the 25-35 age group who have given most thought to emigrating.
Nevertheless, levels of dissatisfaction are so high that the majority in
each age group have given at least some thought to leaving.
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As SAMP has demonstrated elsewhere, thinking about leaving and
actually doing so are not the same thing. The survey therefore sought to
establish the extent to which skilled Zimbabweans have made a mental
commitment to leaving within a certain time frame. Respondents were
therefore asked about the likelihood of their leaving within the next six
months, two years, and five years. Over a quarter (27%) said it was like-
ly or very likely that they would leave in six months. Fifty five percent
were committed to emigrating within the next two years. And 67% said
they were committed to emigrating within the next five years.
These are sobering statistics, unmatched in any other country in the
region in which SAMP has done similar research. They suggest that the
pool of future emigrants in Zimbabwe remains massive. The firmest
indication of migration potential, however, is whether a person has
acted on their desires by applying for emigration documentation. Many
emigrants do not, of course, apply until they are already overseas.
However, the survey found that nearly 20% of the resident skilled popu-
lation had either applied for or were in the process of applying for a
work permit in another country.
Another question addressed by the survey concerns the “perma-
nence” of intended or likely emigration. This is an important issue. Are
people so disillusioned that they wish to leave forever or would they
return if conditions improved for them at home? The survey found that
51% expressed a strong desire to leave permanently (for longer than 2
years), compared with only 25% who have a strong wish to only leave
temporarily. Again, 43% said they would prefer to stay in their most
likely emigration destination for more than 5 years. This is not there-
fore a population that sees emigration as temporary exile.
Why are so many Zimbabweans thinking seriously about leaving?
The reasons for this extraordinary state of affairs can be analysed at two
levels. First, it is possible to point to economic and political events over
the last decade as the primary cause of emigration and high future
potential. These events are too well-known to be repeated here.
Instead, this survey sought to obtain the opinions of skilled
Zimbabweans themselves, to statistically measure levels and forms of
dissatisfaction and disillusionment and relate these to high emigration
potential. 
The survey discovered extremely high levels of dissatisfaction with
the cost of living, taxation, availability of goods, and salaries. But the
dissatisfaction goes deeper than economic circumstances to include
housing, medical services, education and a viable future for children.
South Africans actually show similar levels of economic dissatisfaction
but they are far more optimistic about the future than Zimbabweans.
Asked about the future, there was deep pessimism amongst skilled
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Zimbabweans, with the vast majority convinced that their personal eco-
nomic circumstances would only get worse. They were also convinced
that social and public services would decline further.
The respondents were also asked about their perceptions of political
conditions in the country. Here, too, there was considerable negativity
and pessimism. Ratings of government performance were extremely low.
Various measures have been mooted in Zimbabwe with a view to
keeping skilled people in the country, including compulsory national
service and bonding. A coercive approach to the brain drain has not
worked particularly well elsewhere and often have the opposite effect to
that intended. The survey showed that such measures would only add to
the burden of discontent and for around 70% of respondents would
make absolutely no difference to their emigration intentions.
Zimbabwe faces an immense challenge in stemming the exodus to
other countries within Africa and oversees. The basic conclusion of this
study is that coercive measures will not work and that the best way to
curb the high rates of skilled labour migration lies in addressing the eco-
nomic fundamentals of the country which will ultimately improve liv-
ing standards. Regretably, most skilled Zimbabweans are very pessimistic
that this will happen in the foreseeable future.
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INTRODUCTION
The brain drain has been labelled as one of the greatest devel-opment challenges facing African countries.1 Whether thebrain drain is a “curse” or “boon”, and for whom, is the sub-ject of some debate.2 Adepoju, for example, suggests that the
impact on the countries which have trained, and lost, skills is severe:
Emigration of skilled professionals poses a critical problem
of replacement of the skilled émigrés, the loss of transfer of
experience to younger cohorts and creates a huge vacuum
in tertiary educational institutions of poor countries, of
experienced leaders in research for development and train-
ing of the manpower required for a variety of development
activities. One immediate impact is the lack of capacity to
undertake cutting edge research, or to adapt findings of
such research for development. In many African countries
today, students are being churned out without the requisite
rigour of learning. This development has stalled develop-
ment activities and accelerated a breakdown in institutions
bereft of trained manpower to manage them in an era of
globalised economies.3
He goes on to suggest that the primary reason for the brain drain is
the demand for labour in the industrialized west which:
For economic and demographic imperatives, needs immi-
grants to make up for the demographic deficit occasioned
by an ageing population. Rich countries need two cate-
gories of immigrants to cope with prevailing economic and
demographic imperatives: one set to do poorly paid, dirty,
and dangerous jobs which nationals scorn; and highly spe-
cialised professionals, especially software specialists, engi-
neers, doctors and nurses.4
Another line of thinking tends to blame the developing world for its
own misfortune. In other words, there would be no brain drain if condi-
tions at home were more conducive for skilled people to stay. Harris, for
example, argues that:
If we think of the world as no more than a set of countries
which own their population, then this does look like theft
by the developed countries. But that would be a foolish
way to see it. The loss of skilled and professional workers
on this scale is as much a vote of no confidence in the gov-
ernment concerned as a flight of capital. It becomes more
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like a flight of refugees, a flight from spectacular misgov-
ernment, from appalling working conditions and pay levels
so low that they are below subsistence. The remedy is not
to end the right to work in developed countries but to
make an envrionment at home in which people want to
stay and work.5
It is clear from these extracts, that the brain drain debate is highly
polarized with accusations and counter-accusations, the apportioning of
blame, and a great deal of moral indignation. 
When analysing the Zimbabwean situation, it is important to
acknowledge two things: (a) that the external environment acting on
skilled Zimbabweans is very dynamic. In the last decade there have
been unprecedented opportunities for skilled Zimbabweans to leave the
country for other regional and international destinations;6 and (b) the
push-forces, in terms of domestic conditions, have intensified consider-
ably over the last decade. In combination, these international pull and
local push-forces are encouraging the skilled to leave in unprecedented
numbers. This not only has immediate impacts on the country’s public
and private sectors but could also reduce the ability of the country to
engage in a downstream process of reconstruction. In this context it is
critically important to gauge the mood of the country’s remaining
skilled population. More concretely, it is necessary to try and predict
what future skills losses are likely to be.
The research reported here aims to raise awareness within Zimbabwe
and the SADC of the scope and impact of major international popula-
tion movements out of the country. Particular emphasis is placed on the
prediction of future emigration trends of skilled personnel as well as the
assessment of the policy implications of this form of migration. Similar
research has already been conducted by SAMP in three other countries
of the region: Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa.7 In many ways, the
Lesotho and South African brain drain situations most closely approxi-
mate those of Zimbabwe, and comparisons will therefore be made with
those countries in this paper. In this way, this paper also speaks to the
broader issue of understanding and developing policy positions for the
SADC region as a whole.
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LEAVING ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe has experienced most of the major forms of migrationpatterns since the attainment of independence in 1980.8 Mostof the early work on migration in post-independence Zimbabwefocused on internal migration, largely because it has been the
dominant form of population movement.9 Research on international
migration to and from Zimbabwe has not been as comprehensive,
although it is now growing in scope and importance.10 Cross-border
trading with surrounding countries has also received some attention as
the phenomenon has grown.11 While many of the traders are highly
skilled at what they do, many lack formal educational qualifications.
Most traders are also not generally interested in residence outside the
country; their whole raison d’être is to leave and return. In that sense,
they cannot be considered part of a brain drain of skills from Zimbabwe. 
Labour migrants comprise the largest group of international migrants
both into and out of Zimbabwe. Historically, Zimbabwe has imported
labour from neighbouring states such as Zambia and Malawi.12 More
recently, however, as the economic and political climate in the country
has deteriorated, Zimbabwe has found itself exporting labour to other
countries in the region and abroad. Perhaps the form of migration that
has most consistently aroused emotions in the Southern African region
is undocumented cross-border migration. Unauthorized migrants from
Zimbabwe have increasingly found employment in Botswana and South
Africa in marginal or undesirable jobs. By and large, the evidence seems
to suggest that Zimbabweans who go to South Africa to look for work
do so because they are unemployed and have few marketable skills in
their own country. 
While unskilled labour migration still constitutes the majority of
labour movement from Zimbabwe, skilled out-migration has assumed
increasing importance in recent years.13 Overall, the past two decades in
Zimbabwe have been characterised by annual net migration losses, espe-
cially in the years immediately following the attainment of independ-
ence in 1980. The country experienced net (legal) migration losses in
13 of the 18 years from 1980 to 1997. Between 1980 and 1984, 50 000
to 60 000 whites left the country because they could not adjust to the
changed political circumstances and the net migration loss was over 
10 000 per year.14 The peak net migration loss was experienced in 1981
when 20 536 people left the country against 7 794 arrivals, giving a net
loss of 12 742. The number of emigrants leaving the country each year
declined to below 7 000 in the mid-1980s and to below 3 000 in the
1990s. The decline in emigration from the mid-1980s was in part
because the population base for potential emigrants - mostly the white
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community - had been greatly reduced in number and those who want-
ed to leave for political reasons had already gone.
In the last ten years, as domestic economic and political conditions
have deteriorated, there has been growing concern about the size and
impact of a renewed “brain drain” from Zimbabwe.15 In the past, emigra-
tion was primarily undertaken by whites. Now there appears to be a siz-
able black brain drain taking place. Education and health are the hard-
est hit sectors but many others have left as well. The Economic
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which was adopted by the
government in 1991, has been cited as one the major causes for the
emigration of skilled personnel.16 Other possible incentives to leave for
the skilled and unskilled, either temporarily or permanently, include
political instability, industrial decline and growing unemployment.
Zimbabwean land policy and the current famine may also have an
impact on movement of people out of the country, not only of whites
but also of black farmworkers.
At the same time, the openings for those considering departure have
also shifted markedly. First, the political changes in South Africa after
1990 meant that the country became a newly-desirable destination for
migrants from throughout the continent, not just Zimbabwe.17
Zimbabweans possess a basket of desirable skills, and were very much in
line to take advantage of the deracialization of the South African
labour market. Second, an aggressive hunt for developing country skills
by Europe and North America bas begun as their own populations begin
to grey.18 Third, the globalization of skilled labour markets has new
opportunities and mobility for skilled workers.19 Together, these factors
have transformed the “pull” side of the equation for skilled people from
all of the SADC states.20
There is therefore an urgent need to move beyond the rhetoric to
assess the extent, causes and likely future trends of this new brain drain.
This paper, based on a national survey of Zimbabwe’s resident skilled
population, aims to contribute substantially to that task.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The SAMP survey sought to interview a wide range of profes-sionals drawn from both the public and private sectors inZimbabwe. Key towns were first selected based on their popu-lation size and the range of functions provided. The spatial dis-
tribution of the towns selected was considered with a view to covering as
much of the country as possible. The exclusion of rural centres was based
partly on resource limitations but also on the premise that skilled per-
sonnel are mostly found in urban centres which demand their services.
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The definition of the “skilled” population was the same as that used
by SAMP in its other surveys.21
We therefore define a “skilled” Zimbabwean as someone who: (a) is a
Zimbabwean citizen; (b) is 16 years of age or older; (c) has completed
high school and possessing a diploma or degree from a recognized col-
lege or university (or in the final year of studying for a diploma or
degree; and (d) is currently economically active (employed or looking
for employment). In addition, some high school leavers occupying
accounting, managerial and clerical positions were included in the sur-
vey because of their experience.
The respondents were drawn from a wide range of professions such as
engineering, finance, health, law, police/military and education. The
research assistants were University of Zimbabwe students and the survey
instrument was the same as that previously utilized in South Africa,
Botswana and Lesotho. Two methods were used to administer the ques-
tionnaires. In some cases the research assistants left the questionnaires
with the respondents and later collected them after they had been com-
pleted. Alternatively, the research assistants would assist the respon-
dents to fill in the questionnaires. The method used in each case was
determined by the time available to the respondents when the inter-
views occurred.
A total of 900 questionnaires were completed in selected urban cen-
tres, namely Harare, Bulawayo Mutare, Kadoma, Marondera, Rusape
and Masvingo. Five hundred and twenty nine questionnaires were
administered in Harare, the capital, 243 were administered in Bulawayo,
51 in Mutare, 10 in Rusape, 25 in Kadoma, 18 in Marondera and 23 in
Masvingo (Table 1). The total number of respondents in each city was
determined on the basis of the population sizes of these urban centres
using the 1992 census results.
PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS
Table 1 shows the distribution of the respondents by race andarea of residence. The majority of the respondents (58.8%)were drawn from Harare which has nearly half the urban pop-ulation of Zimbabwe. Ninety four percent of the respondents
were black or of African origin, 2% were white, 3% coloured and 1% of
Indian or Asian origin. This distribution closely approximates the
national population breakdown. The net result, however, is that the
absolute numbers of Whites and Indian/Asians interviewed are too
small to make definitive statements about their attitudes and emigration
intentions. 
Of the 900 respondents, 592 (66%) were male while only 308 were
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female (Table 2). The uneven gender distribution reflects the patriar-
chal nature of Zimbabwean society which has traditionally given males
more access to the educational system than females. This “tradition” is
slowly disintegrating but its legacy is still very evident in the distribu-
tion of the educated people in the country by gender. 
The results also suggests that the skills base of Zimbabwe is quite
youthful with 79% of the respondents aged below 35 years (Table 3)
and only 0.023% over 50 years. Again, this is a reflection of a legacy,
this time the colonial system which provided only limited opportunities
for the black population. Eighty four percent of the females were less
than 35 years old, indicative of the efforts of the post-colonial govern-
ment to redress gender imbalances in the inherited educational system.
In terms of marital status, fifty percent of the respondents were mar-
ried, 44% single, 2% divorced, 1% separated, and 2% co-habiting. The
relatively high number of respondents who are not married can, again, be
attributed to the generally youthful nature of the Zimbabwean skills base.
Forty-two percent of the respondents were household heads, 21%
children of household heads and 17% spouses of household heads. In
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 29
9
Table 1: Distribution of Respondents by Race and Town of Residence
Race of Respondents Total
Black/ White/ Coloured Indian/ Number %
African European Asian
Harare 502 9 14 4 529 58.8
Bulawayo 217 12 11 3 243 27.0
Mutare/Rusape 61 - - - 61 6.8
Kadoma 25 1 - - 26 2.9
Marondera 16 - 2 - 18 2.0
Masvingo 23 - - - 23 2.6
Total 844 22 27 7 900 100.1*
* Percentages may not add up to 100 in this and subsequent tables due to rounding
Table 2: Distribution of Respondents by Race and Gender
Gender Total
Male Female Frequency %
Black/African 565 279 844 93.8
White/European 14 8 22 2.4
Coloured 8 19 27 3.0
Indian/Asian 5 2 7 0.8
N=900
addition, 46% of the respondents had no children, 21% had only one
child and 17% had two children. Again this reflects the youthfulness of
the skilled population in the country, but also the general inclination
towards small families that comes along with education and middle-
class lifestyles. Almost a quarter of the respondents (24%) had no-one
who was economically dependent on them while 56% of the respon-
dents had between 1 and 4 people who were totally economically
dependent on them.
As might be expected, the skilled population generally earns higher
salaries than other working groups. About 22% of the respondents said
they earn below Z$11 000, a further 18% earn between Z$11 000 and
Z$17 000, while 23% earn above Z$41 000 (Table 4). However, it is
noteworthy that in absolute terms the skilled population is not very
well off. In fact, as many as 40% of the respondents reported incomes
below the country’s poverty datum line which is currently pegged at
about Z$17 000 for a family of six .
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Table 3: Age Breakdown of Respondents by Gender
Age Gender Total
Male Female Number %
15-24 136 126 262 29.1
25-34 313 132 445 49.4
35-49 122 45 167 18.6
50-59 18 5 23 0.02
Above 60 3 - 3 0.003
Total 592 308 900
Table 4: Household Income of Respondents
Gross monthly income Race of respondents Total
Black/ White/ Coloured Indian/ Number %
African European Asian
Less than Z$11 000 187 3 8 2 200 22.2
Z$11 001- Z$ 17 000 155 2 6 - 163 18.1
Z$17 001- Z$ 23 000 94 1 4 1 100 11.1
Z$23 001- Z$ 29 000 81 1 1 1 84 9.3
Z$29 001- Z$ 35 000 76 5 2 - 83 9.2
Z$35 001- Z$41 000 54 - 2 - 56 6.2
Above $41 000 187 10 4 3 204 22.7
Refused 1 - - - 1 0.1
None 6 - - - 6 0.7
N=900
Generally, the surveyed population was highly qualified: 46% of the
respondents had certificates or diplomas, 25% had bachelors’ degrees,
5% had masters’ degrees while 0.4% had doctorates (Table 5). Twenty
four percent of the sample had only gone as far as high school but the
majority of these people have been employed for a long time by their
companies and have received in house training and become “skilled”
through experience.
The majority of the respondents (74%) interviewed were employed
full-time, 12% on a part-time basis and 3% in the informal sector
(Table 6). Four percent of the respondents were final year students and
another four percent were unemployed.
The respondents were drawn from a wide variety of professions and
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Table 5: Educational Qualifications of Respondents
Educational Qualifications Race of Respondents % Total
% Blacks % Whites % Coloureds % Indians
Bachelors Degree 25 22 4 43 25
Masters Degree 5 9 4 - 5
Doctorate Degree 0.5 - - - 0.4
Diploma/Certificate 47 32 37 29 46
High School Certificate 23 32 56 29 24
N= 900
Table 6: Employment Status of Respondents
Race of respondents Total
Black/African White/ Coloured Indian/Asian
European
Employed (Full-time) 624 13 19 6 662
Employed (Part-time) 102 1 4 - 107
Self-Employed in Formal 22 5 1 1 29
Sector (Full-time)
Self-Employed in Formal 1 2 - - 3
Sector (Part-time)
Self-employed in 23 - 2 - 25
Informal Sector 
Pensioner 4 - - - 4
Unemployed 32 - 1 - 33
Final Year Student 36 1 - - 37
N=900
sectors (Table 7). The services industry and banking/finance together
made up almost 50% of the sample. A large proportion of the respon-
dents in the service industry were engaged in retail as well as transport
and communication. Another 16% were employed in the
education/research field and 14% in professional practice such as medi-
cine, law, engineering and information technology. Other employers
included heavy industry, government, the military and agriculture.
PREDICTING EMIGRATION
The prediction of future emigration patterns of skilled person-nel from a country is a challenging task. Firstly, the factorsshaping and influencing the migration intentions of individu-als are not static but change in response to dynamic variables
such as the state of the country’s economy and political conditions.
Second, the measurement of intentions is not a definite indicator of the
likely future plans of individuals since other factors may have an impor-
tant role in determining the actual decisions. Thus economic and social
factors may prevent the realisation of an individual’s migration inten-
tions. Nonetheless, an examination of the intentions of skilled person-
nel currently residing in a country gives an idea of the probable future
trends. Such a study should seek to elicit the opinions of the skilled so
as to determine their future emigration plans. Emigration potential is a
measurement of the likelihood of the skilled population leaving a coun-
try. In essence, the emigration potential is a measure of the respondents’
intentions to leave the country. Various parameters can be used to pre-
dict the emigration potential of skilled Zimbabweans, such as the extent
to which they have considered emigrating from the country, the factors
affecting their decision to move, their most likely destinations and the
perceived length of their stay in their most likely destination.
Table 8 summarises answers to the question of whether respondents
had given any thought to leaving Zimbabwe. It is apparent that the vast
majority have given a great deal of thought to the option of emigrating.
Fifty seven percent of the respondents have considered the possibility of
emigrating from the country a great deal while 29% have given the pos-
sibility of leaving the country some consideration. Only 13% of the
respondents indicated that they have never considered emigrating from
the country and these are treated as having a low potential of leaving
the country. Strikingly, black Zimbabweans have given more thought to
leaving than white (although the white sample is too small to make any
definitive comparison and the survey was undertaken before the recent
seizures of white farms).
THE NEW BRAIN DRAIN FROM ZIMBABWE
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Table 7: Employment Sectors of Respondents
Frequency Percentage
Service Industry 221 24.5
Finance/Banking 203 22.6
Education/Research 142 15.8
Professional Practice 127 14.1
Government/Military 97 10.8
Heavy Industry 97 10.8
Retail 93 10.3
Government/Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 88 9.8
Accounting 75 8.3
Other services 60 6.7
Tertiary education 57 6.3
Medical 55 6.1
Banking 51 5.7
Manufacturing 46 5.1
Engineering 46 5.1
Finance 41 4.6
Secondary education 39 4.3
Insurance 36 4.0
Research 25 2.8
Transport and Communication 23 2.6
Primary education 21 2.3
Construction 20 2.2
Food 17 1.9
Automotive 17 1.9
Law Firm 16 1.8
Real estate 15 1.7
Agriculture 13 1.4
Mining 10 1.1
Private Security 10 1.1
Information Technology 10 1.1
Military 9 1.0
Textile 4 0.4
Energy 3 0.3
N=900
Table 8 also provides a comparison with data obtained in three other
SADC countries. In comparison with the 57% of skilled Zimbabweans
who have given a great deal of thought to leaving the country, the
equivalent number was 33% in Lesotho, 31% in South Africa and only
13% in Botswana. Or again, only 13% of skilled Zimbabweans had
given no thought to leaving, compared to 58% of Batswana, 32% of
Basotho and 31% of South Africans. These comparative figures certain-
ly show that skilled Zimbabwean are far more likely to have considered
leaving than their counterparts in the other countries surveyed.
Two parameters were employed to further probe the extent of desire
to leave the country: gender and age. Table 9 shows the extent of con-
sideration of emigration from the country by gender of the respondents.
Perhaps surprisingly, the survey showed that more females (62%) have
seriously considered emigrating from the country (54%) than males. In
addition, slightly fewer females than males had not considered the pos-
sibility of leaving the country (12% compared to 14% for males). This
result contrasts considerably with the findings in South Africa where it
is clear that more men (37%) had given serious consideration to emi-
gration than women (20%), a difference that requires further investiga-
tion and explanation.22
Disaggregated by age, the data shows that the population aged between
25 and 34 years had given the most consideration to the possibility of
THE NEW BRAIN DRAIN FROM ZIMBABWE
14
Table 8: Consideration of Emigration by Race
Consideration Race of Skilled Zimbabweans
of emigration % % % % % Total % SA % Bot % Les
Blacks Whites Coloureds Indians
A great deal 56 50 85 43 57 31 13 33
Some 30 27 11 29 29 38 28 35
None at all 13 23 4 29 13 31 58 32
Don’t know 1 - - - 1 - 1 -
N= 900 725 222 303
Table 9: Consideration of Emigration by Gender
Consideration of emigration Gender of respondents
% Male % Female Total
A great deal 54 62 57
Some 32 24 29
None at all 14 12 13
Don’t know 1 2 1
N=900
leaving the country (Figure 1). In contrast, there is a general increase
within the age groups of the proportion of people who have not consid-
ered leaving the country; for example, only 8% of the respondents aged
between 15-24 had not considered leaving the country, and the propor-
tion rises to 12.1% for the 25-34 age group, 21% for the 35-44 age
group and to 22% for the 45-54 age group. Propensity to join the pool
of potential emigrants therefore declines with age. This is largely attrib-
utable to the fact that the older people have more responsibilities, such
as raising a family, which tend to reduce their chances of ever emigrat-
ing. Nevertheless, levels of dissatisfaction in Zimbabwe are so high that
the vast majority of each age group have given serious thought to leav-
ing.
Two other variables of significance also need to be mentioned. First,
most of those who had given a great deal of consideration to leaving
believed that it would be easy for them to get employment outside
Zimbabwe. Second, migrant networks abroad tended to influence the
consideration given to leaving Zimbabwe. Generally, the respondents
with emigrant networks have the greatest likelihood of having consider-
ing leaving the country. About 70% of those who have considered emi-
gration know of at least one emigrant in the desired country of destina-
tion. 
Figure 1:Consideration of Emigration by Age 
Emigration, at the simplest level, is either temporary or permanent.
Most emigrants have an idea, when they leave, about what they intend
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(although things may work out differently in practice: those who leave
temporarily often end up staying, those who leave for good sometimes
return if things don’t work out). Nevertheless, it is important for the
purposes of this study to determine whether Zimbabwe’s potential emi-
gration pool consists primarily of those who wish to leave for a short
period (less than 2 years) or those who want to go away for longer (over
2 years). 
Table 10 confirms once again that the potential emigration pool is
massive with the vast majority of the population having given thought
to leaving the country. Broken down by duration of desired stay outside
the country, the data shows that some 68% of skilled Zimbabweans wish
to a great or some extent to leave the country for up to two years. But
just as many say they wish to leave for a longer period. In most migra-
tion studies this tends to be a marker of permanent emigration. What is
even more remarkable, or worrying, is that 51% expressed a strong
desire to leave “permanently”, compared to only 25% who have a strong
desire to leave for a short period. In other words, this is a population
more interested in getting out of the country for good. In general, these
respondents tend to be in the 15-39 age group, have fewer dependents
and be mostly single.
The potential pool of permanent and temporary emigrants in the
skilled Zimbabwean population is therefore massive and unprecedented
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Table 10: Extent of Desire to Leave Zimbabwe
Extent of desire to leave Zimbabwe temporarily to another country to leave and work 
(less than two years)
% Blacks % Whites % Coloureds % Indians % Total
Great extent 25 9 26 14 25
Some extent 43 50 56 57 43
Hardly at all 13 14 7 - 13
Not at all 13 18 7 14 13
Don’t know 6 9 4 14 6
Extent of desire to leave Zimbabwe temporarily to another country to leave and work 
(longer than two years)
Great extent 51 50 63 57 51
Some extent 28 14 18 14 27
Hardly at all 8 14 4 14 8
Not at all 8 9 7 - 8
Don’t know 5 14 7 14 6
N=900
by regional standards. However, this does not mean that all of these
people will necessarily leave:
Thinking about leaving, and wanting to do it, are one
thing. Actually doing so is quite another....Emigration is a
formal and often lengthy process that involves obtaining
official documentation, preparing applications and organiz-
ing employment opportunities, quite apart from the sheer
logistics of the move. Thus people who have mentally set a
specific date, or at least a time frame, for leaving are far
more likely to act upon their desires than those who leave
it as an open-ended question.23
The survey therefore sought to establish the extent to which skilled
Zimbabweans have a mental commitment to emigrate within a specified
time frame (Table 11). Specifying a time frame cuts the levels of poten-
tial emigration, but not nearly as dramatically as one might have
expected (based on comparative data from other countries in the
region). The respondents were first asked about the likelihood of emi-
grating within the next six months. Just over a quarter (27%) said it
was likely or very likely that they would leave within 6 months (the
equivalent South African figure was 7%). Slightly more than half
(55%) considered it likely or very likely that they would emigrate with-
in the next two years (South Africa: 25%). In all, 67% indicated that
they were likely or very likely to leave the country within the next five
years (South Africa: 42%). In other words, in South Africa there is a
marked difference between the desire to leave and the likelihood of
doing so. In Zimbabwe, this gap is extremely narrow. 
To summarise, 86% of skilled Zimbabweans have given some thought
to leaving and 51% have a strong desire to leave permanently. Twenty
seven percent say that it is likely or very likely that they would leave
within the next 6 months. As many as 67% say that it is likely or very
likely that they would leave within the next 5 years. These are sobering
statistics which send a clear message that the brain drain from
Zimbabwe is not about to slow.
The firmest indicator of a person’s emigration potential is whether
they have actually begun applying for emigration documentation.
Despite the very high emigration potential captured by other indicators,
fewer respondents had, in fact, started the process of applying for emi-
gration documents. Six percent of the respondents had actually applied
for a work permit in another country while 13% were in the process of
applying (Table 12). Thus, there is a potential loss of nearly 20% of the
country’s workforce to other countries in the short term. Fifty seven per-
cent of the respondents who have applied for a work permit in another
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country are married while 89% are between 20 and 39 years and 84%
have less than five dependents. 
As might be expected, the proportion who had applied or were in
the process of applying for permanent residence and citizenship in
another country was much smaller (at 8%). 
In sum, there is a decline in the indicators of likely emigration as the
survey moves from consideration, to desire, to likelihood. In other
words, as in South Africa, “as greater mental and physical commitments
are required from the respondent, emigration potential declines.”24
However, all of the indicators are higher than those for the other coun-
tries in which SAMP has conducted similar research (Botswana,
Lesotho and South Africa). Particularly concerning is the fact that
there is only a marginal decline in Zimbabwe between desire and likeli-
hood. This suggests Zimbabweans are doing much more than simply
thinking about leaving. If this is the case, then the numbers taking con-
crete measures to leave will quickly increase. The other factor of note, 
is the relatively high proportion who say it is likely they will leave 
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Table 11: Commitment to Emigrate 
Race of respondents
% Blacks % Whites % Coloureds % Indians % Total
(a) Commitment to emigrate in the next six months
Very likely 13 14 22 29 14
Likely 13 14 22 29 13
Unlikely 33 23 19 29 32
Very unlikely 33 41 26 14 33
Do not know 9 9 11 8
(b) Commitment to emigrate in the next two years
Very likely 19 14 37 57 19
Likely 37 27 19 0 36
Unlikely 19 27 7 29 19
Very unlikely 15 23 15 14 15
Do not know 11 9 22 0 11
(c) Commitment to emigrate in the next five years
Very likely 37 27 41 57 37
Likely 30 32 22 0 30
Unlikely 9 23 4 14 10
Very unlikely 10 9 7 0 10
Do not know 13 9 26 29 14
N=900
permanently. The literature suggests that these are people who have
become so disillusioned that they are extremely pessimistic about the
long-term prospects for the country and themselves. This point is
explored further below when we discuss a series of questions relating to
perceptions of the quality of life in Zimbabwe.
DESTINATION COUNTRIES OF EMIGRANTS FROM ZIMBABWE
Table 13 shows that the top six preferred destinations of poten-tial emigrants from Zimbabwe are the United States ofAmerica, the United Kingdom, Botswana, South Africa,Australia/New Zealand and Canada. The United States is
both the most preferred and the most likely destination for around a
quarter of all respondents. The United Kingdom is second, although we
might have expected the UK to be preferable to the United States due
to its historical ties with Zimbabwe. The reason could be the harass-
ment and discrimination that nationals from Zimbabwe have been sub-
jected to in the UK in recent years.25
In terms of other SADC countries, only Botswana and South Africa
rate a mention. Interestingly, Botswana is preferred as a destination to
South Africa. Yet Zimbabweans feel that it is more likely that they will
actually end up in South Africa; testimony to the different employment
possibilities and immigration policies of the two neighbouring countries.
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Table 12: Application for Emigration Documentation
Race of respondents
% of Blacks % of Whites % of Coloureds % of Indians % of Total
(a) Application for a work permit in another country
Yes 6 5 15 14 6
No 81 82 74 57 81
In the process of applying 13 14 11 29 13
(b) Application for permanent residence in another country 
Yes 2 5 7 14 2
No 92 95 81 71 92
In the process of applying 6 0 11 14 6
(c) Application for citizenship in another country
Yes 1 0 7 14 2
No 93 95 89 57 92
In the process of applying 6 5 4 29 6
N=900
DURATION OF EMIGRATION
Abrain drain implies the loss of a country’s productive labourforce to another one. However, emigrants do not necessarilymove permanently or cut ties with their home areas. Indeed,in a globalizing world, transnational linkages between origin
and destination country are becoming increasingly the norm.26
Table 14 reveals that 46% of the respondents would like to stay in
their most likely destination (MLD) for a period not exceeding five
years whereas 44% would like to stay for more than five years. This con-
firms the earlier finding that a significant proportion of skilled
Zimbabweans are interested in long-term relocation from the country.
Eighty seven percent of the respondents who are likely to stay out of the
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Table 13: Destinations of Emigrants from Zimbabwe
Country Frequency Percentage
(a) The Preferred Destinations 
United States of America 242 26.9
United Kingdom 181 20.1
Botswana 115 12.8
South Africa 91 10.1
Australia/ New Zealand 81 9.0
Canada 61 6.8
Other Europe 58 6.4
Other Africa 50 5.6
Other Asia 18 2.0
Other Americas 3 0.3
(b) The Most Likely Destinations 
United States of America 216 24.0
United Kingdom 164 18.2
South Africa 150 16.7
Botswana 128 14.2
Canada 65 7.2
Australia/ New Zealand 64 7.1
Other Africa 51 5.7
Other Europe 45 5.0
Other Asia 14 1.6
Other Americas 3 0.3
Total 900 100.0
country for more than 5 years are between 20-39 years of age. There is
little or no gender difference in terms of permanent emigration.
To assess potential transnational linkages, respondents were asked a
simple set of questions about how often they would return home.
Nineteen percent said they would return only occasionally but only 5%
said they would never come back. Most clearly wanted to be able to
return every year (45%) or every few months (21%). 
In a bid to establish the exact length of likely stay in the MLD, sev-
eral questions were asked. Respondents were first asked to indicate the
extent of their desire to become permanent residents in their MLDs.
Table 15 shows that 52% would like to become permanent residents in
their MLDs. Eighty nine percent of the respondents who said they
would like to become permanent residents in the MLD are between 20-
39 years. Here there was a gender difference, with 49% of males and
58% of females expressing this preference. The figures for citizenship
were very similar; 48% would like to become citizens of their MLD
(54% female, 45% male). However, only 29% of the respondents indi-
cated that they would want to retire in their MLD. Still fewer (16%)
indicated that they would like to be buried in their MLD.
The picture that emerges is of emigrants from Zimbabwe going to
work in another country but maintaining strong personal linkages with
home. The reason why so many would choose citizenship and perma-
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Table 14: Duration of Emigration
Frequency Percentage
Length of stay at the most likely destination
Less than 6 months 37 4
6 months to 1 year 34 4
1 to 2 years 112 12
2 to 5 years 237 26
More than 5 years 394 44
Don’t know 86 10
Frequency of return
Weekly 11 1
Monthly 42 5
Once every few months 185 21
Yearly 404 45
Once every few years 175 19
Never 49 5
Don’t know 34 4
N=900
nent residence could be to guard against possible deportation. However,
while many would countenance being away for a long time, they would
want to come back to retire and pass away in their home country.
Emigration also involves decisions about property, savings, invest-
ments, and remittances. Willingness to sever these links is a far better
indicator of the intention to return.27 A willingness to cut all ties indi-
cates a strong likelihood of no return. Table 16 summarises the extent
to which the potential emigrants say they would maintain links with
Zimbabwe. Only 12% would be willing to sell their houses in Zimbabwe
while 22% said they would take their savings from Zimbabwe. In addi-
tion, only 20% of the respondents indicated that they would be willing
to take all their investments out of Zimbabwe. Seventeen percent would
be willing to give up their Zimbabwean citizenship. These findings have
several implications. First, they reveal that emigrants from Zimbabwe
are likely to maintain property and financial links with their home
country. Second, they are not prepared to give up everything they have
in the country, which could be a reflection of their desire to eventually
return to the country. Third, most migrants would like to maintain their
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Table 15: Extent of Desire to Settle in Most-Likely Destination
Race of respondents % Total
% Blacks % Whites % Coloureds % Indians
Extent of desire to become a permanent resident in your MLD
Great extent 28 54 37 71 29
Some extent 23 14 22 0 23
Total 51 68 59 71 52
Extent of desire to become a citizen of your MLD
Great extent 24 45 44 57 25
Some extent 23 23 11 0 23
Total 47 68 55 57 48
Extent of desire to retire in your MLD
Great extent 14 45 26 43 15
Some extent 14 14 15 0 14
Total 28 59 41 43 29
Extent of desire to be buried in your MLD
Great extent 7 41 19 43 9
Some extent 7 14 4 0 7
Total 14 55 23 43 16
N=900
Zimbabwean citizenship, which indicates that while conditions in the
country are not to their liking, they still have a strong sense of
Zimbabwean identity which would not be destroyed by emigrating.
THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN ZIMBABWE
The abnormally high emigration potential of Zimbabwe’s skilledpopulation is clearly apparent. However, the reasons for thissituation need to be probed in relation to domestic social,economic and political conditions. Why are so many
Zimbabweans thinking seriously about emigration? Beyond the obvious
explanation of economic decline and political turmoil, it is useful to see
what the people themselves feel about the quality of life in Zimbabwe.
The year 1991 saw the ushering in of the Economic Structural
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which was aimed at liberalising the
economy, reducing the government budget deficit and reducing public
expenditure. The removal of price controls and subsidies resulted in a
price escalation of most basic goods. Zimbabwe’s more recent economic
travails have led to rampant inflation and shortages of consumer goods.
Table 17 reveals extremely high levels of dissatisfaction with the cost of
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Table 16: Maintenance of Links with Zimbabwe
Frequency Percentage
Willingness to sell house in Zimbabwe
Very willing 61 7
Willing 44 5
Total 105 12
Willingness to take savings out of Zimbabwe
Very willing 95 11
Willing 103 11
Total 198 22
Willingness to take all investments out of Zimbabwe
Very willing 84 9
Willing 103 11
Total 187 20
Willingness to give up Zimbabwean citizenship
Very willing 81 9
Willing 74 8
Total 155 17
N=900
living (89%), level of taxation (83%), availability of quality affordable
products (75%), and level of income (72%). These results are a reflection
of the difficulties that have been associated with the country’s decline in
the 1990s; including high inflation coupled with low salaries.
But the dissatisfaction goes much deeper than economic circum-
stances. The upkeep of public amenities was a source of dissatisfaction
for 74%, as was the perceived future for children (71%), housing avail-
ability (69%), medical services (61%) and education (57%).
Zimbabwean dissatisfaction is pervasive and deep. A comparison
with South Africans on this point is instructive. South Africans show
similar levels of dissatisfaction with their personal economic circum-
stances but are far more optimistic about the future, and the quality of
social services such as health, education and housing.28
The deep pessimism shown by many respondents was confirmed in
questions asking whether they thought that conditions would improve
in the country in the next five years. Table 18 shows that skilled
Zimbabweans think that conditions in the country will only get worse.
Seventy two percent felt the cost of living would increase and 71%
thought that the level of taxation would increase, while 67% thought
THE NEW BRAIN DRAIN FROM ZIMBABWE
24
Table 17: Satisfaction with the Quality of Life in Zimbabwe
Dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with: Zimbabwe % South Africa %
Cost of living 89 71
Your job 46 23
Prospects for professional advancement 46 30
The security of your job 45 26
Your level of income 72 37
Ability to find a house you want to live in 69 21
Ability to find a good school for your children 57 27
Ability to find medical services for family and children 61 21
Your level of taxation 83 74
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others 64 59
Your personal safety 56 66
Your family’s safety 56 68
The future of your children in Zimbabwe 71 55
Upkeep of public amenities 74 70
Availability of quality affordable products 75 28
Customer service 53 56
N= 900 725
that the upkeep of public amenities would decline and 66% were wor-
ried about the uncertain future of their children in Zimbabwe. The pes-
simism about the future emanates from the present economic hardships
currently facing the country and the respondents do not see an immedi-
ate end to these difficulties. They predict that the high inflation levels
currently being experienced by the country will persist and the level of
taxation will also remain high. In fact, Zimbabweans are among the
most taxed people in the world and the respondents do not see an end
to the high tax regime experienced in the country. 
SKILLED PERSONNEL AND POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE
International migration can never be divorced from the political sit-uation in a country. Since the government of the day has a majorinput into the way the economy is run, the level of dissatisfactionin the country’s labour force is heavily dependent on government
policy. Unlike unskilled migrants, skilled personnel are highly mobile
and may express their disappointment or disagreement with government
by emigrating to other countries. Hence skilled labour may ‘vote with
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 29
25
Table 18: Perceptions of Future Conditions in Zimbabwe
Frequency Percentage
Do you expect the following to get worse or much worse in the next 5 years
Cost of living 654 73
Your job 395 44
Prospects for professional advancement 367 41
The security of your job 422 47
Your level of income 521 58
Ability to find a house you want to live in 558 62
Ability to find a good school for your children 497 55
Ability to find medical services for family and children 562 62
Your level of taxation 637 71
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others 511 57
Your personal safety 464 52
Your family’s safety 479 53
The future of your children in Zimbabwe 593 66
Upkeep of public amenities 600 67
Availability of quality affordable products 602 67
Customer service 455 51
N=900
its feet’ in stating its dissatisfaction with the economic and political cli-
mate prevailing in a country.
Several political issues were therefore raised in the survey to deter-
mine the impact of government upon their lives. Table 19 shows that
only 11% of the respondents approved/strongly approved of the way the
government had performed its job in the previous year. None of the
white respondents (but only 12% of blacks) approved of the govern-
ment’s actions over the previous year. Only 12% said they could always
trust the government to do what is right while a mere 15% believe that
the people in government are interested in hearing what they have to
say. Over 80% of skilled Zimbabweans believe that they are unfairly
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Table 19: Perception of Government 
Frequency Percentage
Approval Rating:
Do you approve of the way the national government has performed 
its job over the last year? (% approve/strongly approve) 100 11
How much of the time can you trust the government to do what 
is right? (% of the time) 107 12
How interested do you think the government is in hearing what 
people like you think? (very interested/quite interested) 136 15
Responsiveness of Government
Interest of government in the opinions of (% yes):
People of your race group 152 17
People of your economic class 123 14
People who share your home language 137 15
Impact of government
Impact of the actions of the government over the last year (% positive or very positive):
Personally 90 10
On people of same race 123 14
On people who share same language 121 14
On people in same economic class 75 8
On Zimbabwe 84 9
Discrimination by Government
Extent to which the following are unfairly treated by government (% always or to a large extent)
People of your group 340 37.8
People who share your home language 340 37.8
People of your economic class 358 39.7
You personally 345 38.4
N=900
treated by the government in terms of their race, language group and
economic class. These are extraordinarily high levels of dissatisfaction
by any standard. It should be born in mind though that this is not a
general survey of Zimbabwean political attitudes. One can certainly see,
however, why the opposition MDC enjoys support amongst the more
educated urbanites in the country.
The only policy which seems to command support is public-sector
employment. Since independence, the Zimbabwean Government has
adopted policies which promote the hiring of the indigenous black pop-
ulation. The black population has historically been disadvantaged and
affirmative action aimed to redress some of the injustices. Survey results
show that 68% of the sample support or strongly support affirmative
action (Table 20). Although the sample is small, only 32% of whites
opposed affirmative action (compared with 83% of whites in South
Africa). Males (73%) are more supportive of affirmative action policies
than females (59%), possibly because they are the major beneficiaries.
Affirmative action policies, unlike in South Africa, are therefore
unlikely to have a significant role to play in emigration decisions.
CONDITIONS ABROAD
The respondents were asked to compare the conditions in thecountry and those in their most likely destination (MLD).Generally, potential emigrants are likely to take a dim view ofconditions at home and to romanticize those abroad.
However, the question is worth asking to ascertain the nature and size
of the gap between the two. Table 21 shows that the conditions that are
most attractive to prospective emigrants in the MLDs include the lower
cost of living, prospects for professional advancement, availability of
quality affordable products and high incomes. Overwhelmingly, there-
fore, it is the economic prospects of the MLD that provide the attrac-
tion to hard-pressed Zimbabweans.
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Table 20: Attitudes towards Affirmative Action
Race of respondents % of Total
% of Blacks % of Whites % of Coloureds % of Indians
Strongly support 42 14 22 14 40
Support 29 36 22 14 28
Oppose 12 18 7 29 12
Strongly oppose 10 14 26 0 10
Don’t know 8 18 22 43 9
N=900
MIGRANT NETWORKS
The survey also sought to establish the prior travel experiencesof the respondents in order to help determine their emigrationpotential. Generally, people who have wider travel experi-ences are likely to be conversant with the conditions prevail-
ing in the desired destinations and the potential emigrants also get to
know about the opportunities and constraints to movement and settle-
ment in the destination society. 
Table 22 shows that skilled Zimbabweans are generally not well-trav-
elled, meaning that they have limited contact with both people and
firms in the country of destination. It is important to note that most of
the people who have travelled outside the country have ended up in
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Table 21: Comparison Between Zimbabwe and Overseas Destinations
Race of respondents % Total
% of Blacks % of Whites % of Coloureds % of Indians
Better or much better overseas
Cost of living 88 86 81 71 88
Your job 83 68 74 43 82
Prospects for professional 80 59 74 86 79
advancement
The security of your job 59 50 67 14 59
Your level of income 88 77 78 71 87
Ability to find a house 58 68 67 71 59
you want to live in
Ability to find a good school 61 68 56 29 60
for your children
Ability to find medical services 74 73 78 57 74
for family and children
Your level of taxation 74 82 63 72 73
Relative share of taxes paid 66 59 63 57 65
in comparison to others
Your personal safety 49 68 37 29 49
Your family’s safety 49 68 37 29 49
The future of your children 66 82 67 57 66
Upkeep of public amenities 73 86 78 71 74
Availability of quality 86 91 85 71 86
affordable products
Customer service 71 77 70 43 71
N=900
African destinations, particularly in Southern Africa. This is because
travel costs are lower for destinations within the region compared to
those overseas. It is not surprising that 90% of whites have been to
European countries while only 4% of blacks have been to Europe.
Since international migration depends on the flow of information
between the potential migrant and the desired country, the survey also
sought to establish the main sources of information about job opportu-
nities in other countries. Most of the respondents (70%) cited friends as
their main sources of information about job opportunities in other
countries (Table 23). This suggests that Zimbabweans in the country
have numerous friends who have migrated to other countries and are
potentially engaged in chain migration. 
The extent to which Zimbabwe’s skills base has already been bit by
emigration emerged when respondents were asked about their knowl-
edge of other emigrants. Firstly, 52% of the respondents have at least
one emigrant amongst the members of their immediate family (Table
24). Second, 73% of the respondents know at least one emigrant
amongst members of their extended family. As many as 81% know a
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Table 22: Experience of Regular Travel Abroad
Frequency % of total
Travel once a year or more to:
Southern Africa 227 25
Elsewhere in Africa 72 8
Europe 37 4
North America 9 1
Australia/New Zealand 8 1
Asia 9 1
N=900
Table 23: Sources of Information about Job Opportunities in Other Countries
Race of respondents % of Total
% of Blacks % of Whites % of Coloureds % of Indians
Get information about job opportunities in other countries once in a while or often from:
Professional 
journals/newsletters 64 45 63 86 64
Newspapers 68 59 56 86 68
Friends 70 59 67 57 70
Family 51 64 59 71 51
Professional associations 54 41 59 29 53
N=900
close friend who has emigrated to another country. Furthermore, 69%
indicated that they know a co-worker who has left for greener pastures
while 76% know of at least one person in their profession who has emi-
grated to another country. Zimbabweans are far better “networked” than
South Africans in this regard (Table 24). 
These results have serious implications for the likelihood of skilled
personnel in Zimbabwe leaving the country in the future. Firstly, the
knowledge of members of immediate family and friends living abroad
can itself trigger migration. Secondly, the knowledge of other people
within the profession who have left also provides a psychological push
to the potential emigrants since they are assured of getting a job in the
country of destination.
Zimbabweans are also relatively optimistic about their ability to find
employment in other countries. As many as 40% of the respondents
believed that it would be easy for them to leave Zimbabwe to go and
work in another country (Table 25). 
CONCLUSION
Zimbabwe has been experiencing a significant and escalatingbrain drain. The dimensions and reasons for this brain drainhave been documented elsewhere.29 In this study, we have takenthe fact of the brain drain for granted and focused instead on the
skilled people who remain. If the skilled population is essentially con-
tented and giving no thought to emigration, then we could safely say
that the brain drain is a passing phenomenon which will soon draw to a
close. In fact, the primary finding of this study is exactly the opposite.
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Table 24: Knowledge of Other Emigrants Abroad
Race of respondents
% of % of % of % of % of % of
Blacks Whites Coloureds Indians Zimbab- South
weans Africans
Knows at least one emigrant amongst
Members of immediate family 52 45 52 29 52 19
Members of extended family 74 59 74 57 73 36
Close friends 81 91 67 71 81 59
Co-workers 69 73 44 57 69 40
People in profession known 
personally 76 86 59 71 76 57
N= 900 725
Zimbabwe’s skilled population is not only highly discontented with
domestic economic, social and political conditions, but they are
extremely pessimistic about the possibility of positive change within the
next 5 years. The net result is a population with an extremely high emi-
gration potential. 
Various measures have been mooted by government with a view to
keeping people in the country, including compulsory national service
and bonding. The coercive approach to the brain drain has not worked
particularly well elsewhere, so it is worth asking whether it is likely to
have any impact in Zimbabwe. In fact, the survey shows that such
measures could have the opposite effect to that intended, further adding
to the burden of discontent that is encouraging so many to leave or
think of leaving. 
Firstly, the respondents were asked whether it would make any differ-
ence in their plans to emigrate if the government were to introduce
measures that would make it more difficult for them to emigrate. Sixty
seven percent of the respondents said that this policy would make no
difference or it would make it more likely. Second, the majority of the
respondents indicated that it would make no difference or would make
it more likely for them to emigrate if the government was to require
people leaving professional schools to do one-year national service in
their area of expertise. Third, making Zimbabweans hold only one pass-
port would not affect the emigration plans of most skilled Zimbabweans.
Fourth, increasing fees for emigration would also not have an impact on
the emigration plans of the respondents. These findings have important
policy implications for they reveal the shortcomings of coercive meas-
ures in dealing with the brain drain. 
The most important factors identified in this research as the driving
forces of skilled emigration are the high cost of living currently prevailing
in the country and the high level of taxation. Additional push factors
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Table 25: Ease of Leaving Zimbabwe
Race of respondents % of Total
% of Blacks % of Whites % of Coloureds % of Indians
How Easy or Difficult Would It Be for You to Leave Zimbabwe to go and Work in Another 
Country If You Wanted To?
Very easy 14 27 15 0 14
Easy 25 45 19 29 26
Difficult 36 23 41 43 36
Very difficult 19 5 11 0 18
Don’t know 6 0 15 29 7
N=900
include the lack of quality affordable products, poor upkeep of public
amenities, level of income, the future of children in Zimbabwe and the
ability to find decent housing. Inability to meet basic economic and
other needs has resulted in major discontent among the population, a
definite spur to people to move to other countries.
The majority of the people who have a high emigration potential are
in the 25-35 age group which represents the bulk of the economically
active group in Zimbabwe which generally has a youthful population.
The effect of the emigration of skilled labour from the country is likely
to significantly reduce the population of skilled labour in the country.
Thus, the loss of economically active, skilled people to other countries
represents a crippling loss to Zimbabwe. It has also been seen that the
majority of those who want to emigrate from the country intend to stay
outside the country’s borders for at least two years. It is also disturbing
to note that nearly 70% of the people interviewed in this research say
they are likely to emigrate within the next five years. Equally concern-
ing is the fact that nearly 20% of the people interviewed have already
applied for work permits in their intended countries of destination or
are in the process of applying.
Thus, Zimbabwe faces a huge challenge in stemming the brain drain
to other countries within Africa and overseas. Already the country is
experiencing the effects of the brain drain in sectors such as health,
where the brain drain to Botswana, South Africa and the United
Kingdom has compromised the quality of health delivery in the country.
The research has documented the root causes of discontent among the
skilled personnel of Zimbabwe and these have been identified as the
high cost of living, the high levels of taxation, and the low level of
income. The government therefore needs to make the cost of living
affordable, not only for the skilled personnel, but for the majority of the
population. Measures are required which will arrest the current high
rate of inflation currently running in excess of 50%. Zimbabweans have
long been amongst the highest taxed workers in the world. The high
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Table 26: Emigration Policy and Likelihood to Emigrate
Frequency Percentage
Make no difference/more likely to emigrate from the country
If the government took steps to make it more difficult to emigrate 601 67
If the government required people leaving professional schools to do  
one year national service in their area of expertise 603 67
If the government was going to allow people to hold only one passport 657 73
If the government increase fees for emigration 622 69
N= 900
taxes on their own reduce economic growth as they affect the dispos-
able income available to the workers.
It is imperative that the government implements measures to stem
the brain drain from the country. However, the study has also shown
the likely ineffectiveness of coercive or restrictive policies in stemming
the brain drain. The only way to curb the high rates of skilled labour
migration from the country lies in addressing the economic fundamen-
tals of the country which will ultimately improve living standards.
Already key sectors are reeling from the impacts of the brain drain
which makes the need to implement effective policies all the more
urgent. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has played
a lead role in the repatriation of emigrants living in foreign countries
with mixed results.30 The programme is weak in that it tends to dress
the wound without addressing the root cause of the injury. The pro-
gramme might be effective in re-attracting emigrants back to Zimbabwe
but the success of such an initiative would be short-lived as they would
soon be confronted with the economic realities which caused them to
emigrate in the first place. Thus the economic conditions in the coun-
try need to be improved so as to re-attract the emigrants living abroad
and also to stop the potential migrants from leaving the country.
Finally, the research has contributed much to the understanding of
the present and probable migration trends from the country. The brain
drain is usually publicised when certain sectors of the economy have
been affected. The research has taken a new approach to the study of
international migration in Zimbabwe in that it focused not so much on
the results of the brain drain but attempted to project future migration
trends of skilled personnel from the country. The conditions promoting
the migration of skilled labour in the country have been highlighted as
well as the pull factors in the countries where the skilled personnel are
likely to end up. The majority of the skilled population in the country
has an extremely high emigration potential, and should their plans be
realised, the country stands to suffer, perhaps irreparably.
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